Andrew L. Urban
The Tasmanian Parole Board last year acted contrary to the High Court’s rulings when it tightened the parole condition on Sue Neill-Fraser, prohibiting her from claiming her innocence of the 2009 murder of Bob Chappel, her former partner. Concerned that the Tasmanian Supreme Court is taking too long to hear a challenge to the new condition from the Human Rights Law Centre in Melbourne on Neill-Fraser’s behalf (lodged in April 2025), we tasked Legal Intel AI (LIA) to research the matter. LIA found the parole condition legally faulty.
The new parole condition on Sue Neill-Fraser prohibits her from communicating “directly or indirectly – including through third parties, written statements, electronic communications, social media platforms, television, radio, podcasts, streaming services, online video-sharing platforms, or any other public or broadcast media – to assert claims regarding your alleged innocence, wrongful conviction, or dispute the legitimacy of your conviction or sentencing”. This is wrong.
The High Court has repeatedly affirmed (e.g. Lange, McCloy, Brown v Tasmania) that the implied freedom protects communication about the administration of justice, criminal law, courts, prisons, parole systems, and miscarriages of justice. Claims of wrongful conviction are core political communication. While prisoners’ rights can be restricted, the High Court has never held that parolees lose the implied freedom altogether. Restrictions must still satisfy structured proportionality.
The High Court test (simplified) asks:
(1) Does the condition burden political communication? Yes – profoundly.
Bans any assertion of innocence; bans indirect communication; bans third-party relaying; bans all media formats (written, oral, digital, broadcast); operates indefinitely while on parole. This condition is one of the widest speech prohibitions imaginable.
(2) Is the purpose legitimate? The Parole Board has not provided a rationale – on its face the condition has no legitimate purpose.
Further, there is no rational connection of the condition: There is no evidence that asserting innocence increases risk to the community. Courts have repeatedly recognised that maintaining innocence is not incompatible with rehabilitation (especially in contested convictions). And – as we all know – public criticism of convictions is common and lawful (journalists, academics, politicians do it daily).
Even aside from constitutional issues, the condition is vulnerable to judicial review on orthodox grounds. The condition goes well beyond what is needed for parole supervision. It is capricious in scope, covering private written statements and third-party speech. And if the condition’s real purpose is to protect the reputation of institutions, or to silence criticism of the conviction, that would be an improper purpose.
And of course, courts have not endorsed bans on proclaiming innocence, bans on criticising convictions, no bans aimed at silencing public debate. Such conditions often survive only because they are not challenged, not because they are sound.
If the Parole Board finds, rightly or wrongly, that Neill-Fraser has contravened this condition, she could be returned to prison and required to serve the last 10 years of her head sentence.