Andrew L. Urban
Bruce Lehrmann has been refused special leave to appeal to the High Court against his Federal Court civil conviction but did not rule on the merits of the rape finding. It simply decided the proposed appeal did not raise a sufficiently arguable legal question to justify granting special leave.
“Special leave refused with costs,” the High Court said in a short judgment published on its website on Thursday (April 9, 2026). The High Court stated that the proposed grounds “have insufficient prospects of success”, and the case did not raise a question of law of public importance warranting High Court consideration.
The main grounds on which Lehrmann had sought special leave to appeal:
- Alleged judicial bias and use of extraneous material
Lehrmann argued that Justice Lee compromised impartiality by referring to or researching academic material about sexual-assault behaviour and trauma responses, which his lawyers said amounted to the judge conducting his own research rather than relying solely on evidence presented in court.
They argued that this denied procedural fairness and influenced credibility assessments.
- Procedural unfairness / natural justice
He contended that the trial process was procedurally unfair, particularly because the judge ultimately found a form of rape different from what he said had effectively been pleaded or argued during the trial.
His lawyers argued that:
- the case had been framed around allegations of violent rape,
- but the judge’s factual findings effectively described a non-violent sexual assault occurring without consent,
- and therefore Lehrmann was not given a fair opportunity to respond to that characterisation.
- Error by the Full Federal Court in strengthening the findings
When the Full Court dismissed his appeal in 2025, it went further than Justice Lee and stated that the only reasonable inference was that Lehrmann knew Higgins was not consenting but proceeded anyway.
In seeking High Court review, Lehrmann argued the appellate court exceeded the scope of the trial judge’s findings and made its own stronger factual conclusions.
Young Bruce is merely another victim of “feminist jurisprudence” which in case no one has noticed, has usurped the role of common law throughout the west. It is about nothing if not the denial of due process. The matriarchy rules, OK.
The High Threshold for Special Leave in the High Court of Australia
It is worth bearing in mind, as a matter of general principle, that obtaining special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia is deliberately difficult. The Court is not designed to operate as a routine third level of appeal, nor to re-hear disputes simply because a party remains dissatisfied with the outcome below. Its role is far narrower and more selective.
Each year, the High Court receives a substantial number of special leave applications, but only a small fraction are granted. Over the past decade, the figures have been strikingly consistent. Annual applications have typically ranged between roughly 300 and 550, while grants of special leave have generally fallen between about 35 and 55 per year. In percentage terms, that equates to a success rate usually hovering between approximately 8 and 14 per cent, often summarised as “about one in ten” applications succeeding.¹ These figures underscore the reality that refusal is not unusual, but the expected outcome in most cases.
The threshold is intentionally high. An applicant must demonstrate not merely that an error may have occurred, but that the case raises a question of law of public importance, a matter requiring resolution of conflicting authority, or an issue with broader implications for the administration of justice across Australia. In other words, it is not enough to argue that a decision is wrong; the argument must engage principles that extend beyond the individual case.
The Court has consistently emphasised that it is not a forum for revisiting factual findings or reassessing credibility. Those matters are ordinarily the domain of trial judges and, more narrowly, intermediate appellate courts. By the time a case reaches the High Court, the focus shifts to whether there is a clearly arguable legal question warranting the Court’s limited and valuable time. Even then, the grant of special leave remains discretionary.
For that reason, a refusal of special leave does not carry the same meaning as a full appeal judgment. It does not involve a detailed reconsideration of the evidence, nor does it produce comprehensive reasons addressing every contention advanced by the parties. Rather, it reflects the Court’s assessment that the proposed appeal does not meet the stringent criteria for further review whether because the arguments lack sufficient prospects of success, or because the issues raised do not have the wider legal significance required to justify intervention.
Importantly, this approach serves a broader institutional purpose. The High Court’s limited capacity is reserved for cases that clarify and develop the law at a national level. By maintaining a high bar for entry, the Court ensures that its resources are directed toward matters of general importance, rather than functioning as a final avenue of appeal in every individual dispute.
In that context, the refusal of special leave should be understood as an ordinary feature of Australia’s appellate system. It reflects the constrained and specialised role of the High Court, rather than any singular characteristic of a particular case.
¹ See, e.g., High Court of Australia Annual Reports (2018–19 to 2024–25), which consistently record several hundred special leave applications annually, with approximately 40–50 grants per year.
And in case you wonder about the High Court accepting the appeal in Pell … it was based on whether the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal majority had correctly applied the test for an “unreasonable verdict.” Whether, on the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. Whether, on the whole of the evidence, it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. That does not mean it is conducting a retrial. Instead it asks: Taking the evidence at its highest for the prosecution, was it logically possible for a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt? All 7 on the bench agreed it was not.