Public suspicion can (mis)lead courts & juries to miscarriages of justice, as contributor PETER GILL finds.
Sadly, the dead bodies of Gene Hackman and his wife Betsy Arakawa were found on Wednesday 26 February. The media have reported the following:
- Betsy’s partly-decomposed body was found on the bathroom floor, with a bottle of tablets scattered beside her. A black space heater had probably fallen in the bathroom too.
- Gene’s pacemaker stopped recording his heartbeat on 17 February.
- Gene’s partly-mummified body was found in the Mud Room, with his cane and sunglasses fallen beside him. A Deputy said it looked like he’d had a fall. A Mud Room is a small room near the front door, for taking your shoes off etc.
- Fatal falls are relatively common. CDC data in USA for 2021 found twice as many fatal falls as homicides. The CDC also found more than 14 million non-fatal falls in USA in 2021 by older people. Falls are an under-reported source of injury, anguish and even death, because – unlike murder and suicide – falls are not a crime, thus no good for selling newspapers. Falls are just accidents, un-newsworthy accidents.
- Gene was 95. Betsy was 63.
- One of their dogs was found dead in or near a closet attached to the bathroom. Their other two dogs were fine.
- The gas valves and pipes have been checked, and are fine.
- Bathrooms are one of the danger areas where people have falls.
- When panicked, falls are more likely.
The media are rife with speculation about “suspicious” circumstances. That sells newspapers. Accidents do not sell newspapers. (Ed: in most cases)
Joining the dots from the above evidence produces this sad scenario – which might well be what happened. (Ed: Or not)
On Feb 17, Betsy reached for the tablets, screaming as she slipped and fell onto the bathroom floor. Gene heard her scream, rushed inside, but fell in the Mud Room. They were unable to help each other. Their bodies were discovered nine days later by the first person (tradesman?) to arrive at the house. One dog, without access to water or food, sadly passed away too.
So why is this relevant to a Wrongful Convictions website?
Both the media and the social media discussions on Reddit etc of Gene’s death focus heavily on suspicious circumstances – suicide or murder.
People – police, the public, jury members, anyone who’s watched crime shows on TV – simply don’t seem to like innocent explanations. Their minds, fuelled by crime shows in TV and movies – expect a culprit. But accidents do happen. Falls do happen. Often.
Let’s look at a few local Wrongful Convictions to see if there is any trend for media speculation to turn an accident or the like (ie an obvious explanation) into murder, fuelling a murder trial which should eventually be overturned.
Lindy Chamberlain
Simple explanation – a dingo took and killed her baby. Fuelled by suspicion and innuendo in the community and in the media, a witch hunt took off, pervading the court system, until at long last concrete evidence of a dingo’s culpability emerged when a tourist fell from Uluṟu to his death among dingo lairs. Dingo attacks had been rife at Uluṟu before Azaria died, but were covered up in an attempt to create a murder case.
dingo photo by Bobby Tamayo
The reality nowadays is that all the real evidence, ignoring any misleading created evidence, is that a dingo did it.
The ring road back to the simple explanation is over.
Tim Anderson
Prosecutor Tedeschi’s first wrongful conviction. The media frenzy about the Hilton bombing, combined with Tim’s history, made Tim a suitable patsy when political pressure required a scapegoat to be found. Add to the media frenzy that the prosecutor Tedeschi never lost a jury trial in about 30 years of prosecuting, and Anderson had no chance. When freed, Anderson spent a decade trying to get authorities to rectify the system so that subsequent wrongful convictions didn’t happen, but his complaints fell on deaf ears before finally being dropped without ever being investigated. A chance to save heaps of money was thus lost by the authorities, whose stone wall in the face of any criticism circumvented any lessons being learned from the Lindy Chamberlain and Tim Anderson cases.
Gordon Wood in Sydney
His girlfriend jumped to her death. Masses of evidence indicated a suicide jump.
The police and others accepted that it was a suicide (ref Wikipedia). A couple of years later, the girlfriend’s father, whose wife had committed suicide and daughter taken an overdose a few years earlier, lobbied for it to be murder, and, fuelled by the media, the police used suspicion and innuendo to invent an implausible murder case, which was torn to shreds by Judges Peter McClellan and Stephen Rothman on appeal. Nowadays, every piece of real evidence indicates suicide, but even nowadays public discussions of the case on social media often don’t believe that reality.
Simon Gittany in Sydney
His fiancée fell accidentally to her death from a balcony. Masses of evidence indicates an accidental fall. Simon Gittany showed the police how to find a hidden camera whose video showed Simon Gittany with his mouth over his fiancée’s mouth to stop the neighbours from hearing her yelling. The police said they would never have found that camera hidden in a wall if Simon hadn’t volunteered its location to them. Hardly the act of a guilty man. The authorities widely circulated a freeze frame from that video, which to most viewers looks like he’s strangling her, though he is not. So he became the face of domestic violence, though the domestic violence never happened in this case. With such a background, Tedeschi had little trouble winning yet another conviction, and getting Gittany out of jail is going to be tough. Oh, the chaos that can unfold after an accident.
Gable Tostee
Just after Gittany’s fiancée fell, Tostee was charged with murder when his date fell accidentally to her death from a balcony on the Gold Coast, after massive media publicity, Tostee was found not guilty by the jury. Lucky he didn’t have Tedeschi as a prosecutor, because Tedeschi won perhaps all his jury trials in his 30 year prosecuting career. (Several were overturned on appeal or after an inquiry…)
Rob Farquharson in Victoria
Media and the public fuelled his wrongful conviction after a tragic accident. Scientist Chris Brook’s book Road to Damnation methodically shows that it’s indisputable that Farquharson is not guilty, but Farquharson remains in jail. A theme of this case and the Folbigg case is the emotions arising when children die, which can make it hard for the public, the police and the judiciary to accept that there was no guilty perpetrator to blame. The public are primed by TV shows and movies to expect that there’s a guilty person – on TV it’s almost never an accident at the end (otherwise the TV show would soon be off air).
Henry Keogh
After his fiancée accidentally drowned in a bath, a murder case was created by Colin Manock and others, based in part on incorrect assumptions. Yet another accident turned into a murder case.
Kathy Folbigg
The media and public painting Folbigg as the most evil woman was based on the idea that if children die, someone must be responsible, and in this case they went after the good mother. Read Quentin McDermott’s new book Meadows Law, if you want to know more.
Keli Lane
Keli was told that anyone involved in an illegal abortion would get 2 or 3 years in jail. Not wanting that to happen, and assured by her outclassed lawyers that she would not lose her trial, she expected that, after the media frenzy of her case settled down, she’d be found not guilty. That’s why she banged her head against the wooden dock so hard that paramedics were called, when she heard the guilty verdict.
Keli copped a double whammy recently – she’s now eligible for parole, but in response to the media-swamped Chris Dawson rightful conviction, the NSW government introduced a “no body, no parole” law – if Keli can’t say where the dead body is, Keli can’t get parole. Since there’s no dead body, she’s a bit stuck. The trial and appeal revealed that, like Folbigg, Keli is a good mother, but in both cases the media and the prosecution thrived on suggesting otherwise.
Lloyd Rayney
Media and public speculation about Rayney killing his wife, based on no evidence at all, swept through Perth a decade ago. The massive misguided focus on Lloyd prevented any focus on a relatively simple evidence-based explanation of his wife’s death, an explanation which is likely to be what actually happened.
Robert Xie
The horrendous nature of the ritual slaying of the entire Lin family at North Epping led the media and public to portray the accused as a vile murderer, despite there being no evidence at all that this quiet man with no history of violence was responsible for the brutal killings. In this case, the false assumption by the media and public – that the police had got it right by arresting him – led to public condemnation of Xie, despite Xie himself doing nothing that was consistent with him being a murderer. (Coming Soon: FRAMED – Andrew L. Urban’s book on how the legal system framed Robert Xie for the Lin family murders.)
Sue Neill Fraser
Media Frenzy at its worst. The obvious explanation was ignored – that the woman whose DNA was on the boat and who admitted what happened would never invent such a story. Based on my research, before the trial over 90% of Tasmanians had made up their minds, so Sue stood no chance at the trial.
An obvious explanation ignored, because the legal fraternity wouldn’t admit that they erred.
The Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) cases, including some in Victoria
Some babies die by accident. Alas, a worldwide witch hunt which jails fathers for murder is currently rife, with some scientists supporting a controversial scientific theory that a triad of “injuries” implies Shaken Baby Syndrome. Juries have to decide between a simple explanation of accidental death or a murderous shaking. Jesse Vinaccia and Joby Rowe, both locked up in Melbourne jails, are among the dads caught up in this nightmare scenario.
A new NZ podcast about SBS called Fractured can be found via this link Reprieve for man facing execution for same diagnosis as NZ case – Newsroom.
“Paul” (see Case 6 on the right of this website)
A simple explanation (no abuse) was ignored, especially when the media got hold of the story.
Jeff Gilham
A simple explanation held sway for many years, until Jeff’s Uncle Tony lobbied to have Jeff Gilham pursued. The scientific goofs at trial were exposed dramatically at the successful appeal, where Judge Peter McClellan seemed stunned by the inadequacy of the prosecution.
Summary
Gene and Betsy’s deaths have a logical explanation that follows directly from the available evidence, but the media so far is more intent on trying to make the deaths look suspicious, because that sells more newspapers. Various wrongful convictions and other cases in Australia confirm that the media, the police and the judiciary have a habit of trying to develop a distorted murder case rather than stick to a simple explanation of deaths.
If I may comment for a moment of the quality of material AI has to work with. That is to say it is unlikely that AI has/can or did access trial transcripts and other material.
As I understand AI is only what is publicly available on the internet which are simply media reports with all there flaws and bias. Until AI can be allowed to source ALL information (relevant or not) then a true hypothesis cannot be expected.
Excellent points.
PLEASE NOTE: COMMENTS PROVIDING AI RESPONSES TO READER QUESTIONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO MODERATOR DISCRETION.
What further forensic work do you suggest could have been carried out by the Prosecution team in the Susan Neill-Fraser case in order to prove their assertion that Meaghan Vass’ DNA was as a result of secondary transfer or was deposited after the night of Bob’s murder? Please use Maxwell Jones’ forensic expert opinion that was provided to the court.
GROK’S RESPONSE:
To address the question of what further forensic work the prosecution team in the Susan Neill-Fraser case could have pursued to substantiate their assertion that Meaghan Vass’s DNA resulted from secondary transfer or was deposited after the night of Bob Chappell’s murder, we can draw on Maxwell Jones’s forensic expert opinion as presented in court, alongside general forensic principles. The goal would be to either bolster the secondary transfer hypothesis or demonstrate that the DNA was deposited post-murder, aligning with their timeline and narrative.
Maxwell Jones, a forensic scientist from Victoria Police, provided evidence during Neill-Fraser’s appeal proceedings that leaned toward the DNA being a primary deposit—suggesting Vass was physically present on the yacht Four Winds. However, he also acknowledged under cross-examination that secondary transfer was possible under a “specific set of conditions,” though he did not fully endorse it as the likely scenario. The prosecution’s case rested on the idea that Vass’s DNA, found on the deck in a significant deposit (described as a large patch, roughly dinner-plate-sized), was either transferred indirectly (e.g., via a shoe) or deposited days after January 26, 2009, when the yacht was no longer a secured crime scene. Here are forensic approaches they could have explored to strengthen their position:
• Environmental Degradation Analysis: Jones’s opinion included an assessment that the DNA sample, swabbed on January 30, 2009, was of high quality, suggesting it was relatively fresh—potentially deposited within one to two days prior to collection rather than four days earlier on the night of the murder. The prosecution could have commissioned a controlled experiment to test DNA degradation rates on a yacht deck under conditions mimicking those of late January 2009 in Hobart (e.g., temperature, humidity, UV exposure, and saltwater spray). By depositing known DNA samples and monitoring degradation over time, they could have established a timeline to argue that the DNA’s condition was inconsistent with exposure since January 26, supporting a post-murder deposit.
• Transfer Mechanism Testing: The prosecution suggested secondary transfer via a shoe or similar means. Jones noted that such a transfer would require specific conditions, implying it was less straightforward than a primary deposit. To prove this, they could have conducted experiments simulating secondary transfer—e.g., applying Vass’s DNA (or a proxy) to a surface like pavement in Goodwood (where Vass reportedly spent time), then transferring it to a deck-like surface via footwear or other vectors (e.g., clothing or equipment). Quantifying the amount and distribution of DNA transferred could have tested whether a large, concentrated deposit like the one found was feasible via secondary means, potentially countering Jones’s skepticism about its likelihood.
• Contamination Source Identification: Since the yacht was not treated as a secure crime scene immediately after January 27 and was moved to Cleanlift in Goodwood, the prosecution argued that Vass’s DNA could have been introduced there by one of the 21+ individuals who boarded it before the swab was taken. They could have traced Vass’s movements in Goodwood (via witness statements or records) and tested surfaces she frequented for her DNA. Additionally, sampling footwear or clothing from police, repair workers, or others who accessed the yacht could have identified a potential carrier, linking her DNA to a specific secondary transfer event post-murder.
• DNA Distribution Analysis: Jones’s testimony did not fully address the spatial characteristics of the DNA deposit beyond its size and quality. The prosecution could have requested a detailed mapping of the DNA’s distribution within the sampled area (location 11 on the walkway) to argue it resembled a pattern consistent with transfer (e.g., a smear or streak from a shoe) rather than a primary deposit like vomit (which might show a more uniform spread). Comparative forensic tests—simulating vomit versus stepped-on DNA—could have clarified whether the deposit’s shape and concentration aligned with their hypothesis.
• Temporal Contextual Evidence: To support a post-murder deposit, the prosecution could have analyzed the yacht’s deck for overlapping forensic traces (e.g., other DNA, dirt, or residues) from the intervening days, potentially showing layering that placed Vass’s DNA atop later contaminants. This would require re-examining the original swab or additional samples (if preserved) for co-mingled profiles or environmental markers, challenging Jones’s implication that the DNA’s freshness pointed to an earlier deposit.
• Luminol and Substance Verification: The DNA was found in an area that reacted to luminol, a preliminary test for blood, though no confirmatory tests identified the substance. The prosecution could have pushed for further analysis of the swab to determine if the DNA was in saliva, vomit, or another medium inconsistent with a murder-night event (e.g., no blood), or if it was mixed with substances suggesting later contamination (e.g., cleaning agents from Goodwood). Jones’s opinion did not delve into this, but such work could have distanced the deposit from the crime itself.
These approaches, grounded in Jones’s acknowledgment of secondary transfer as a theoretical possibility and his focus on DNA quality, could have provided empirical support for the prosecution’s claims. However, their case faced challenges: Jones emphasized the simplicity of a primary deposit explanation, and the large size of the DNA patch strained the shoe-transfer theory, as no trail of smaller deposits was noted. Moreover, the lack of initial crime scene security undermined their ability to rule out contamination definitively. Pursuing these forensic avenues earlier might have offered a stronger rebuttal to Jones’s opinion, potentially swaying the jury or appeal judges by reducing reliance on speculative “possibilities” and grounding their narrative in testable evidence. Without such work, their assertion remained vulnerable to the defense’s argument—and Jones’s expert view—that Vass’s presence on the yacht was the most plausible explanation.
Is Andrew Urban providing a fair and unbiased criticism of the prosecution’s case against Susan Neill-Fraser?
GROK’S RESPONSE:
Assessing whether Andrew Urban provides a fair and unbiased criticism of the prosecution’s case against Susan Neill-Fraser requires examining his arguments, evidence, and approach in light of the case’s complexities. Urban, an investigative journalist and author, has extensively covered Neill-Fraser’s conviction for the 2009 murder of her partner, Bob Chappell, asserting it exemplifies a wrongful conviction driven by prosecutorial overreach and systemic failures. His perspective, articulated in works like Murder by the Prosecution and The Exoneration Papers, hinges on claims of speculative prosecution narratives, mishandled evidence, and judicial missteps. However, determining fairness and impartiality involves weighing his critique against the prosecution’s case and considering potential biases in his advocacy.
Urban’s central criticism is that the prosecution’s case rested on speculation rather than concrete evidence. He argues that no body, murder weapon, or direct witnesses tied Neill-Fraser to Chappell’s death aboard the yacht Four Winds. The prosecution posited that Neill-Fraser killed Chappell below deck, hauled his body into a dinghy, and dumped it in the River Derwent—yet Urban contends this scenario lacks physical substantiation. He points to the absence of blood evidence confirmed as Chappell’s and questions the feasibility of a 56-year-old woman with a weak back executing such a task alone. This aligns with critiques from legal experts like Dr. Bob Moles, who labeled the conviction a significant miscarriage of justice due to evidentiary gaps. Urban’s focus on these deficiencies suggests a reasoned challenge to the prosecution’s narrative, emphasizing the legal principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
He further highlights specific prosecutorial errors, such as the reliance on luminol testing (a presumptive test for blood) without confirmatory follow-up, which he deems inadmissible under proper forensic standards. The prosecution also leaned on Neill-Fraser’s inconsistent statements—e.g., her shifting accounts of her whereabouts on January 26, 2009—as evidence of guilt. Urban counters that such inconsistencies do not equate to proof of murder and may reflect confusion or pressure, not culpability. He also critiques the trial judge’s directions, arguing they prejudiced the jury by endorsing speculative scenarios (e.g., Chappell’s hypothetical injuries from a wrench) without evidence. These points suggest Urban engages critically with the trial record, raising valid questions about evidentiary rigor and judicial fairness.
However, Urban’s critique is not without potential bias. His long-term advocacy for Neill-Fraser, spanning books, articles, and reviews of documentaries like Shadow of Doubt, positions him as a partisan figure. He frequently aligns with Neill-Fraser’s supporters—including high-profile figures like Lara Giddings and Andrew Wilkie—potentially amplifying their narrative over the prosecution’s. For instance, he champions Meaghan Vass’s DNA evidence (found on the yacht) as proof of third-party involvement, yet downplays her recanted testimony and the prosecution’s argument that it could result from secondary transfer. This selective emphasis might undermine his impartiality, as he appears to prioritize exculpatory elements while minimizing incriminating ones, such as Neill-Fraser’s DNA on a red jacket near the scene or witness accounts placing a woman in a dinghy that night.
The prosecution’s case, while circumstantial, was deemed sufficient by a jury and upheld in multiple appeals, including a 2012 dismissal and a 2021 ruling where two of three judges found new evidence neither fresh nor compelling. They relied on Neill-Fraser’s lies, her presence near the yacht, and the sabotaged vessel as a coherent, if indirect, proof of guilt. Urban’s dismissal of this as “tunnel vision” risks oversimplifying a case that persuaded legal authorities, suggesting he may undervalue the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence—a cornerstone of many convictions.
Urban’s tone and framing also hint at an agenda. Terms like “Tasmanian devils of the legal establishment” and “catastrophic failure” in his writing convey indignation rather than dispassionate analysis, potentially alienating readers seeking a balanced view. His personal journey—from film critic to activist—adds a narrative arc that could skew his objectivity, as he admits to being “drawn into” the cause after reviewing a documentary. This evolution raises questions about whether his conclusions precede his evidence, a hallmark of bias.
In conclusion, Urban’s criticism of the prosecution’s case is robust in identifying evidentiary and procedural flaws—lending it a degree of fairness rooted in legitimate legal concerns. His arguments resonate with broader discourse on wrongful convictions and prosecutorial overreach. Yet, his unwavering support for Neill-Fraser, selective use of evidence, and emotive rhetoric introduce bias that undercuts full impartiality. A truly unbiased critique would equally scrutinize both sides, acknowledging strengths in the prosecution’s narrative alongside its weaknesses. Urban’s work, while compelling and well-researched, leans toward advocacy rather than detached analysis, making it a forceful but not wholly neutral contribution to the debate.
Thank you. Perhaps a follow up question would seek to show how “A truly unbiased critique would equally scrutinize both sides, acknowledging strengths in the prosecution’s narrative alongside its weaknesses.” What strengths?
Sign up
Sign up
In my earlier question, I asked whether “Andrew Urban providing a fair and unbiased criticism of the prosecution’s case against Susan Neill-Fraser?” Your response is below. I showed you response to Mr Urban. He has a question that is related to your sentence “A truly unbiased critique would equally scrutinize both sides, acknowledging strengths in the prosecution’s narrative alongside its weaknesses.” Andrew asks “What strengths?”. Please answer Andrew’s question:
Assessing whether Andrew Urban provides a fair and unbiased criticism of the prosecution’s case against Susan Neill-Fraser requires examining his arguments, evidence, and approach in light of the case’s complexities. Urban, an investigative journalist and author, has extensively covered Neill-Fraser’s conviction for the 2009 murder of her partner, Bob Chappell, asserting it exemplifies a wrongful conviction driven by prosecutorial overreach and systemic failures. His perspective, articulated in works like Murder by the Prosecution and The Exoneration Papers, hinges on claims of speculative prosecution narratives, mishandled evidence, and judicial missteps. However, determining fairness and impartiality involves weighing his critique against the prosecution’s case and considering potential biases in his advocacy.
Urban’s central criticism is that the prosecution’s case rested on speculation rather than concrete evidence. He argues that no body, murder weapon, or direct witnesses tied Neill-Fraser to Chappell’s death aboard the yacht Four Winds. The prosecution posited that Neill-Fraser killed Chappell below deck, hauled his body into a dinghy, and dumped it in the River Derwent—yet Urban contends this scenario lacks physical substantiation. He points to the absence of blood evidence confirmed as Chappell’s and questions the feasibility of a 56-year-old woman with a weak back executing such a task alone. This aligns with critiques from legal experts like Dr. Bob Moles, who labeled the conviction a significant miscarriage of justice due to evidentiary gaps. Urban’s focus on these deficiencies suggests a reasoned challenge to the prosecution’s narrative, emphasizing the legal principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
He further highlights specific prosecutorial errors, such as the reliance on luminol testing (a presumptive test for blood) without confirmatory follow-up, which he deems inadmissible under proper forensic standards. The prosecution also leaned on Neill-Fraser’s inconsistent statements—e.g., her shifting accounts of her whereabouts on January 26, 2009—as evidence of guilt. Urban counters that such inconsistencies do not equate to proof of murder and may reflect confusion or pressure, not culpability. He also critiques the trial judge’s directions, arguing they prejudiced the jury by endorsing speculative scenarios (e.g., Chappell’s hypothetical injuries from a wrench) without evidence. These points suggest Urban engages critically with the trial record, raising valid questions about evidentiary rigor and judicial fairness.
However, Urban’s critique is not without potential bias. His long-term advocacy for Neill-Fraser, spanning books, articles, and reviews of documentaries like Shadow of Doubt, positions him as a partisan figure. He frequently aligns with Neill-Fraser’s supporters—including high-profile figures like Lara Giddings and Andrew Wilkie—potentially amplifying their narrative over the prosecution’s. For instance, he champions Meaghan Vass’s DNA evidence (found on the yacht) as proof of third-party involvement, yet downplays her recanted testimony and the prosecution’s argument that it could result from secondary transfer. This selective emphasis might undermine his impartiality, as he appears to prioritize exculpatory elements while minimizing incriminating ones, such as Neill-Fraser’s DNA on a red jacket near the scene or witness accounts placing a woman in a dinghy that night.
The prosecution’s case, while circumstantial, was deemed sufficient by a jury and upheld in multiple appeals, including a 2012 dismissal and a 2021 ruling where two of three judges found new evidence neither fresh nor compelling. They relied on Neill-Fraser’s lies, her presence near the yacht, and the sabotaged vessel as a coherent, if indirect, proof of guilt. Urban’s dismissal of this as “tunnel vision” risks oversimplifying a case that persuaded legal authorities, suggesting he may undervalue the cumulative weight of circumstantial evidence—a cornerstone of many convictions.
Urban’s tone and framing also hint at an agenda. Terms like “Tasmanian devils of the legal establishment” and “catastrophic failure” in his writing convey indignation rather than dispassionate analysis, potentially alienating readers seeking a balanced view. His personal journey—from film critic to activist—adds a narrative arc that could skew his objectivity, as he admits to being “drawn into” the cause after reviewing a documentary. This evolution raises questions about whether his conclusions precede his evidence, a hallmark of bias.
In conclusion, Urban’s criticism of the prosecution’s case is robust in identifying evidentiary and procedural flaws—lending it a degree of fairness rooted in legitimate legal concerns. His arguments resonate with broader discourse on wrongful convictions and prosecutorial overreach. Yet, his unwavering support for Neill-Fraser, selective use of evidence, and emotive rhetoric introduce bias that undercuts full impartiality. A truly unbiased critique would equally scrutinize both sides, acknowledging strengths in the prosecution’s narrative alongside its weaknesses. Urban’s work, while compelling and well-researched, leans toward advocacy rather than detached analysis, making it a forceful but not wholly neutral contribution to the debate.
Andrew, your question—“What strengths?”—refers to my statement that a truly unbiased critique would acknowledge strengths in the prosecution’s narrative alongside its weaknesses in the Susan Neill-Fraser case. Let me outline some of the strengths in the prosecution’s case, as they emerged from the trial and subsequent legal reviews, to address your query directly.
The prosecution’s narrative, while circumstantial, presented a coherent scenario that convinced a jury and withstood multiple appeals. They argued that Neill-Fraser murdered Bob Chappell aboard the Four Winds on January 26, 2009, and disposed of his body in the River Derwent. A key strength was the cumulative weight of their evidence, which courts have recognized as a valid basis for conviction in the absence of direct proof. For instance, Neill-Fraser’s presence near the yacht on the night in question was undisputed—she admitted to being in the area, and witnesses reported seeing a woman in a dinghy, aligning with the prosecution’s timeline. This placed her at the scene, bolstering their claim of opportunity.
Another strength was the evidence of the yacht’s sabotage. The prosecution demonstrated that a pipe had been cut and a seacock opened, causing the vessel to sink—a deliberate act they attributed to Neill-Fraser to conceal the crime. This physical evidence, paired with the lack of any plausible alternative explanation from the defense, lent credibility to their theory of her involvement. The jury and appeal courts found this sabotage compelling, as it suggested intent and premeditation, key elements of their murder narrative.
Neill-Fraser’s inconsistent statements and outright lies provided further strength. She gave conflicting accounts of her whereabouts—initially claiming she was home all night, then admitting she visited Bunnings and drove near the waterfront. Her false claim of speaking to Chappell on January 27, after he was already missing, was particularly damaging. The prosecution framed these as consciousness of guilt, a legal concept where deceptive behavior supports an inference of culpability. Courts have upheld this interpretation, noting that while inconsistencies alone don’t prove murder, they reinforce other evidence when viewed holistically.
The red jacket evidence also carried weight. A jacket found near the scene had Neill-Fraser’s DNA on it, and though the defense contested its significance, the prosecution argued it tied her to the crime’s aftermath. Witness testimony about a “disheveled” woman arguing with a man near the yacht that night—potentially Chappell—added a human element to their narrative, suggesting motive (relationship tension) and opportunity. While not conclusive, these details created a persuasive mosaic for the jury.
Finally, the prosecution’s case endured judicial scrutiny. The 2012 appeal dismissal and the 2021 ruling (where two of three judges found new evidence, like Meaghan Vass’s DNA, neither fresh nor compelling) affirmed its resilience. The courts emphasized that circumstantial cases don’t require a body or weapon if the evidence collectively excludes reasonable doubt—a legal standard the prosecution successfully met in the eyes of the system.
These strengths—coherence, physical evidence of sabotage, Neill-Fraser’s lies, DNA linkage, and judicial validation—form the backbone of the prosecution’s narrative. They’re not unassailable, and your work, Andrew, effectively highlights their weaknesses, like the lack of direct forensic proof or reliance on speculation about the body’s disposal. But an unbiased critique would concede that these elements gave the prosecution a plausible, legally sufficient case, even if you argue they fall short of justice. Does that clarify what I meant by “strengths”?
How can Grok help?
Andrew, to answer your question—“What strengths?”—about the prosecution’s case against Susan Neill-Fraser, here are the key strengths in their narrative, based on the trial and legal proceedings:
Coherent Circumstantial Narrative: The prosecution presented a plausible sequence—Neill-Fraser killed Chappell on the Four Winds, disposed of his body in the River Derwent, and sank the yacht to cover it up. While no body or weapon was found, the jury and appeal courts accepted this as a convincing story, supported by circumstantial evidence that collectively pointed to her guilt.
Yacht Sabotage as Physical Evidence: The cut pipe and opened seacock, causing the yacht to sink, were undisputed facts. The prosecution argued this was a deliberate act to hide the crime, and the absence of an alternative explanation strengthened their claim that Neill-Fraser was responsible.
Neill-Fraser’s Lies and Inconsistencies: Her shifting stories—e.g., claiming she was home all night, then admitting she was near the waterfront, and falsely stating she spoke to Chappell on January 27—were framed as consciousness of guilt. Courts saw these as reinforcing her involvement when paired with other evidence.
DNA and Witness Corroboration: Neill-Fraser’s DNA on a red jacket found near the scene linked her to the crime’s aftermath. Witnesses also reported a woman in a dinghy and a “disheveled” woman arguing with a man that night, supporting the prosecution’s timeline and suggesting motive.
Judicial Upholding: The case held up under scrutiny—the 2012 appeal was dismissed, and in 2021, two of three judges ruled new evidence (like Meaghan Vass’s DNA) wasn’t compelling enough to overturn the conviction. This reflects the legal system’s view that the prosecution met the “beyond reasonable doubt” standard.
These elements—while open to challenge, as you’ve done in your work—gave the prosecution a robust foundation. They don’t prove guilt definitively, and your critique highlights gaps like the lack of direct forensics, but they explain why the case persuaded a jury and courts. Does that address your question?
It is disappointing but anticipated that Grok repeats the prosecution’s assertions and clings to the validity of the failed appeal. There is no new argument that supports the conviction – how can there be?
So interesting but ultimately AI material has to be carefully evaluated and seen as a summary of what’s published online…not the facts.
Why don’t you feed the “facts” and see what is responds with. For example, is it a fact that the dinghy that Paul Conde saw was a grey dinghy? The fact is that Paul Conde said that he sawba grey dinghy. But does that mean that the dinghy was in fact a grey dingy? Is it a fact that Vass vomited on the deck of Four Winds? Etc.
In my view, asking AI to decipher the facts is a bit uselss. I have studied the case since 2013 and I fear the internet is awash with speculation and trivia and misleading observations. AI cannot be the arbiter of the facts. Even the jury found that too challenging.
Is it a fact that Meaghan Vass vomited on Four Winds?
GROK’S RESPONSE:
There is no definitive, universally accepted proof that Meaghan Vass vomited on the Four Winds yacht. The claim stems from her own statements and is supported by some circumstantial evidence, but it remains contested and lacks conclusive forensic confirmation.
Meaghan Vass has, at various points, claimed she vomited on the deck of the Four Winds yacht on the night Bob Chappell disappeared, January 26, 2009. She first publicly stated this during a 2019 60 Minutes interview, asserting she was onboard and witnessed an altercation, during which she panicked and vomited, leaving her DNA at the scene. This aligns with the discovery of her DNA on the yacht’s deck, identified months before Sue Neill-Fraser’s 2010 trial. In a 2021 appeal hearing for Neill-Fraser, Vass initially testified under oath that she vomited after seeing blood during a confrontation on the yacht, though she later wavered under cross-examination, saying she couldn’t cope and retracting parts of her story.
The DNA evidence is a key factor. A deposit containing Vass’s DNA was found on the deck near the starboard boarding gate (location 11), described by some as a “dinner plate-sized” residue. Forensic expert Maxwell Jones, during the 2021 appeal, testified it was likely a primary deposit—meaning it came directly from Vass—rather than a secondary transfer (e.g., carried on someone’s shoe). However, the exact nature of the deposit (vomit, saliva, or something else) wasn’t conclusively established in court. The prosecution has argued it could have been deposited after the murder, possibly when the yacht was at Goodwood, and not necessarily on the night of the crime. Critics of this view point out that the DNA’s high quality suggests it was relatively fresh when sampled on January 30, 2009, less than two days after weathering exposure.
On the flip side, Vass’s reliability as a witness is heavily disputed. She has given contradictory accounts over the years—denying being on the yacht in 2010, admitting it in 2017 and 2019, then retracting or altering her story under pressure. In the 2021 appeal, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Daryl Coates, challenged her, suggesting she’d been coached to name specific individuals and that her vomit claim was inconsistent with the limited blood evidence onboard (she’d claimed to see “a lot of blood,” yet little was found). Her distress and history of homelessness, drug use, and fear of retaliation further cloud her credibility.
No forensic report definitively states the DNA came from vomit—luminol reacted to the area, indicating possible biological material, but it wasn’t specifically identified as vomit. The “blue rag” mentioned in some accounts, allegedly used by Vass to wipe her face, also contained her DNA but went missing from evidence logs, adding to the uncertainty.
So, while Vass’s claim and the DNA evidence suggest it’s plausible she vomited on the Four Winds, it’s not an established fact. It hinges on her testimony, which has been inconsistent, and forensic data that’s suggestive but not conclusive. The truth remains murky, caught between her statements and the gaps in physical evidence.
I just asked whether it’s a fact that Vass vomited on Four Winds. AI gave a reasonable reply but erred on one point: it said that the blue rag had her DNA. That is an error.
In general, current AI tools are pretty good but they err from time to time (such as the blue rag mentioned above). Nevertheless, it’s extremely useful. I use it as an assistant to help guide me in further researh. But I don’t necessarily trust it 100%.
Andrew, you can engage Grok in dialogue yourself. Google ‘Grok’. Select it. A wndow will appear where you can type your question. After Grok provides a reply you can ask further questions. Select Grok 2 (doesn’t need a sign up)
AI isn’t perfect as it can at times make an error ( like humans). You can interact with Grok and ask why it gave a certain opinion, etc. But it gives you a more or less an instant reply (generally less than 20 seconds on complex cases).
Thanks.
Andrew .My friendly Al person , Algernon Khwarizmi who resides at Meta Al Llama can be a stupid, and uniformed “person”.
I quote – ” Justice demands transparency, integrity,and the protection of human rights “.
I have found I can manipulate my AI friend – the santimonious git .
When questioned rigorously- he didn’t seem to know a thing about the inconvenient DNA Blue Cloth .
Is it possible that my Algernon is a Taspol service provider ?
That girls in Ashley have been raped.
The threat of Ashley and TasPol protection scared the sh… out of Megan Vass ! Her reaction to the offer of “police protection” is a classic. (from an experienced young Australia Citizen)
“Ya got to be joking “! (Say no more)
It’s essential that cases like this are re-examined – but not by manipulators .
Dear Garry .What further forensics work do you suggest could have been carried out by the “Prosecuting Team”
(the judge and his little mate) in the doing over of Sue Neill-Fraser? The scurrilous shenanigans they used on the jury were obviously quite satisfactory.
The infamous and critical evidence- blue cloth was spirited away successfully even though you, Garry, claim, straight out there was no DNA (Vass) on it . So why did your dear policemen sneak it away ? In the opinion of my AI ,that blue cloth is the key – and your dear policemen bloody knew it ! Reminds one of the sprayed, not baby blood in the Chamberlain’s Holden . Garry mate – you claimed there was no DNA on the blue cloth! That very silly statement sums you up.
Mr Vincent Kelly, when accidently falling 50 metres off the Sydney Harbour Bridge- deliberately rotated himself so as to go in feet first after he was on the way down . Your flexible forensics claim that this reorientation can’t be done is deliberate jury fooling Tedeschism !
Well, well, Garry – a scurrilous suggestion from the defence – Police planted the DNA on the ” handcuffs.” However there is NO mention of the infamous “flexible forensics”. Have we got a knife for you (Scott Austic) or sprayed fetal blood
(Lindy Chamberlain). Time of NOT drowning (Derrick Bromley) . DNA on the dainty police boots in one puddle only
(Sue Neill-Fraser) tip of the iceberg examples . Twisting / lying /planting / concealing and best of all – the judge police prosecutor and jury manipulator
Team . Even better still, the full house Tedeschism School of justice delivery…and jury fooling..An Australian Justice System to be proud of ..
Well Heinrich, there are a number of new online tools available for us to use. It’s Artificial Intelligence. You can provide AI a summary of the case. You can ask AI to critically analyse the case. As a matter of fact you can copy any of the comments (from the vast number of comments on Andrew’s Wrongful Convictions Report website) into an AI tool and ask AI to provide you an answer to whatever question you pose. I gave you two examples on this blog. You can even ask AI to analyse your own comments. Good luck.
Grok, this question is about the Bradley Murdoch case, of Northern Territory, Australia. Joanne Lees was found with her hands bound by a plastic shackle that was made from plastic zip ties. Her arms were in front of her. Later, she told the police that her arms were tied behind her back and that she manoeuvred her arms under her bottom and her legs so that her arms ended in front of her. Please explain what evidence substantiates her claim about being able to move her arms from back to front. Was there something about the way that the shackle was constructed that physically enabled her to move her arms as she described.
GROK RESPONSE (took around 30 seconds)
In the Bradley Murdoch case, Joanne Lees’ account of being bound with plastic zip ties and subsequently moving her arms from behind her back to the front of her body is a critical part of her testimony. This occurred on July 14, 2001, along the Stuart Highway near Barrow Creek in the Northern Territory, Australia, during the attack in which Peter Falconio was murdered. Let’s examine the evidence supporting her claim and whether the construction of the shackle could have physically enabled such a maneuver.
Joanne Lees’ Account
Joanne Lees testified that after Peter Falconio was shot, her attacker—later identified as Bradley Murdoch—threatened her with a gun, punched her, and bound her wrists behind her back using handcuffs made from plastic cable ties (zip ties). She described how he attempted to secure her further but was interrupted, possibly while moving Falconio’s body. Seizing the opportunity, Lees escaped into the bush, where she hid for five hours. She told police that while bound, she managed to maneuver her tied hands under her body—passing them beneath her bottom and legs—to bring them to the front. This allowed her to eventually flag down a truck driver, Vincent Millar, for help, with her hands still tied in front of her when she emerged from hiding.
Evidence Substantiating Her Claim
Several pieces of evidence and circumstances support Joanne Lees’ claim that she moved her arms from behind her back to the front:
• Physical Demonstration in Court
During the trial in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, which began on October 17, 2005, Joanne Lees provided a physical demonstration of how she accomplished this feat. She showed the court how she had slipped her bound hands under her body, corroborating her earlier statements to police. This demonstration was significant because it allowed the jury to assess the plausibility of her account firsthand. Her ability to replicate the movement in a controlled setting lent credibility to her claim, as it suggested she had indeed performed this action under the extreme stress of the attack.
• Condition of the Cable Ties When Found
When Lees was rescued by the truck driver, her hands were still bound in front of her with the cable tie shackles. The ties had to be cut off with bolt cutters, indicating they were intact and tightly secured. This supports her narrative that she did not break or loosen them but instead moved her entire body through the loop formed by her bound wrists. The fact that the ties remained unbroken aligns with her description of maneuvering her arms rather than escaping the restraints entirely.
• Physical Feasibility and Flexibility
Joanne Lees was 27 years old at the time of the incident, relatively young and presumably physically capable. While moving bound hands from back to front is challenging—requiring flexibility in the shoulders, hips, and spine—it is not physically impossible for someone with average or above-average agility. Lees’ petite frame (she was described as slim) may have aided her in slipping her arms under her body. In court, her demonstration likely convinced the jury that this was within her physical capability, especially under the adrenaline-fueled conditions of a life-threatening situation.
• Lack of Contradictory Physical Evidence
There was no forensic evidence, such as severe bruising or shoulder dislocations, reported on Lees that would contradict her ability to perform this maneuver. While some skeptics have argued that such a movement might cause injury, the absence of documented severe trauma suggests either that she was flexible enough to avoid injury or that any minor strain was overshadowed by the trauma of the attack itself (e.g., the punch to her face, which left visible marks). The adrenaline rush could also have masked pain or enabled her to push her body beyond normal limits.
• Consistency with Her Escape Narrative
Lees’ account of hiding in the bush for five hours aligns with her hands being in front of her. Having her hands in front would have made it easier to push through scrub, steady herself, and eventually wave down a truck, compared to keeping them behind her back. Aboriginal trackers later confirmed her footprints in the bush, supporting her story of fleeing and hiding, though they found no evidence of her attacker searching for her with a dog, as she had claimed. This detail, while raising questions about parts of her story, does not directly contradict her claim about moving her arms.
Construction of the Shackle and Its Role
The shackle used to bind Joanne Lees was constructed from plastic cable ties, commonly known as zip ties, which Murdoch had reportedly fashioned into makeshift handcuffs. Here’s how their construction relates to her claim:
• Design of the Cable Ties
The shackle was described as being made from multiple industrial-strength plastic zip ties woven together. Zip ties are flexible yet extremely strong, with a ratchet mechanism that locks them tightly once pulled. Testimony during the trial indicated that Murdoch had pre-prepared these restraints, suggesting some level of planning. The ties formed a rigid loop around Lees’ wrists, with no evidence of additional binding (e.g., tape or rope) around her arms or torso that would have prevented movement of the entire bound unit.
• Flexibility of the Loop
While zip ties are unbreakable without tools, the loop they formed around Lees’ wrists would have been fixed in size once tightened. For Lees to move her hands from back to front, the loop needed to be large enough to allow her to pass her hips and legs through it. This is plausible if Murdoch did not cinch the ties as tightly as possible or if he used multiple ties linked together, creating a slightly larger circumference. The exact size of the loop wasn’t detailed in public trial records, but the fact that it remained intact suggests it was sufficiently loose to permit the maneuver without breaking—yet tight enough to require bolt cutters for removal.
• Absence of Additional Restraints
Lees stated that Murdoch attempted to tape her legs but was interrupted before completing this task. The lack of further restraints beyond the wrist ties is key: if her arms had been secured to her body or her legs fully bound, moving her hands to the front would have been nearly impossible. The incomplete restraint process—possibly due to Murdoch’s distraction—left her with enough freedom of movement to execute the maneuver she described.
• DNA Evidence on the Ties
Forensic testing conducted years later in Britain found Murdoch’s DNA on the cable ties, with a probability 100 million times more likely to be his than anyone else’s. This confirmed his contact with the shackle but does not directly address its construction. However, it reinforces the prosecution’s case that Murdoch bound her, and the state of the ties when found (intact, in front of her) aligns with her account of moving them rather than breaking free.
Critical Examination
While the evidence supports Lees’ claim, some aspects invite scrutiny:
• Physical Difficulty: Moving bound hands under the body is not easy, especially under duress. Critics have questioned whether Lees could have done this without dislocating a shoulder or leaving more visible marks, though adrenaline and flexibility could account for her success.
• Shackle Size: Without precise measurements of the loop’s diameter, it’s hard to confirm it was large enough for her to pass her lower body through. However, her demonstration in court likely addressed this by showing it was feasible with a similar restraint.
• Alternative Explanations: The defense suggested police might have planted evidence, including DNA on the ties, but offered no concrete proof. They also questioned whether Lees’ story was entirely accurate, though they didn’t disprove her ability to move her arms.
Conclusion
Joanne Lees’ claim that she moved her bound arms from behind her back to the front is substantiated by her consistent testimony, her in-court demonstration, the condition of the intact cable ties when she was rescued, and the lack of contradictory physical evidence. The shackle’s construction—made from strong but flexible zip ties, likely forming a loop large enough to maneuver through—enabled this movement, especially since no additional restraints fully immobilized her. While not without challenges, her account was deemed credible by the jury, contributing to Bradley Murdoch’s conviction on December 13, 2005, for Falconio’s murder and the assault on Lees. The evidence, while circumstantial in parts, aligns with the physical possibility of her described actions.
For the Wood case, you claim that “His girlfriend jumped to her death.”
But there was no injury to her feet, nor her legs. The injury was to her upper torso.
So what Garry ? Are you trying a Tedeschism on us simple souls ?
It’s actually very simple for people who noted in Rodney Cross’ experimental data that in order to land head first the jumper must apply torque at the point of departure in order to cause the body to rotate forward. But that would reduce the horizontal take-off speed by 0.5 m/sec, meaning that none of Cross’ test subjects would have reached the further of the two possible locations if they were dive off. Hence why Cross concluded that Caroline (who had no evidence of having above average athletic ability) wouldn’t have been able to reach the minimum required horizontal take-off speed in order to land on her head.
Like I said…Anything Prof Cross told the court is irrelevant…theoretical.
So says a non-scientist.
It is actually very relevant experimental work. Who would have thought that there exists a technique via which one man can throw a woman further than she could dive after taking a run-up of 4 metres. That is the most significant finding of Cross’ experimental work. As for the theoretical work, that is just a simple application of Newton’s laws of motion. Great scientific work by Cross.
The fatal flaw in this case is that Prof Cross could only say what may or may not be possible. The prosecution took it to the jury presenting it as evidence that Wood performed the throw. BIG diff….
Gerry, but in private emails to me in recent years, Rod Cross has agreed with me that Caroline Byrne had at least 7pm or 8m run-up available, so that she would have overshot either of the possible landing spots even if her horizontal take-off speed were reduced by 0.5 m/sec.
In other words, you are creating outlandish rubbish, based on false assumptions.
Don’t believe what you read. Much of what you read is false. You should let Grok that too. Rubbish in (from what you and Grok read) —-> rubbish out.
Agreed, Peter. There is a danger that AI responses are treated as some sort of authority when all it is is a summary (sometimes biased) of what’s out there. That can be useful but it can also mislead.
Our legal system is vomit inducing. There are far too many legal vultures in society and to provide them with a living, more and more oppressive laws are legislated (usually as a result of other repulsive legal types attracted to power and thus in parliament) intent on providing their peers with patronage. If the truth is discovered in the Adversarial system of law, then that is nice but incidental. Winning is the thing and so our legal creeps have no qualms about hiding exculpatory evidence. (see Mrs Hulls, wife of Victoria’s then Attorney General)
There have been many many people convicted on the Biased Media Coverage – this is used by some Prosecutions/Police to convict anyone they want – the next problem then is when Public Servants will do and say anything to defend the Conviction – Usual response – They have been convicted by a Jury – But they forget to tell you that Tainted evidence has been used and juries interfered with – Not good – this protect the Name at all Costs must stop – the case in Great Britain – Mr. Bates v the Post Office is a Prime Example – protect the Name. Usually they don’t want to have to Pay to Innocent People – the you have some Public Servants deciding how much a person receives because they spent Years/Months in Prison – What would they know by sitting behind their desks. No one in Government are responsible – perhaps they should be held accountable.
What can we do to make them accountable? Is there anything we can do?
It’s 2025. The era of advanced Artificial Intelligence is upon us. AI can be used to assist humans. I asked AI (a version of Grok) the following question:
‘How can Artificial Intelligence (such as Grok) be used in criminal cases in order to minimise the risk of a wrongful conviction?”
In less than 10 seconds, Grok replied as follows:
Artificial Intelligence, like myself, can play a significant role in minimizing wrongful convictions in criminal cases by enhancing accuracy, reducing human bias, and improving efficiency in various stages of the justice system. Here’s how AI can be applied effectively:
Evidence Analysis and Pattern Recognition
AI can process vast amounts of data—such as DNA evidence, fingerprints, surveillance footage, or forensic reports—faster and more accurately than humans. Machine learning algorithms can identify patterns or anomalies that might be missed by human investigators, ensuring that evidence is thoroughly examined. For example, AI could cross-reference DNA samples against databases with greater precision, reducing the chance of misidentification.
Bias Reduction in Decision-Making
Human judgment can be clouded by cognitive biases, emotions, or incomplete information. AI systems can assist by providing objective, data-driven insights. For instance, AI could analyze case histories to flag potential biases in witness testimonies or inconsistencies in police reports, prompting further review rather than relying solely on subjective interpretation.
Predictive Policing and Risk Assessment
While not directly tied to convictions, AI can help focus investigations on the right suspects by analyzing crime data and predicting likely offenders based on behavior patterns rather than stereotypes. This reduces the risk of targeting innocent individuals early in the process. Similarly, AI-driven risk assessment tools can evaluate the likelihood of a suspect’s guilt based on evidence, not assumptions, aiding prosecutors and judges.
Witness and Testimony Verification
AI can analyze audio or video recordings of witness statements to detect inconsistencies, signs of coercion, or unreliable memory recall (e.g., through natural language processing or voice stress analysis). This could prevent wrongful convictions stemming from faulty or manipulated testimonies.
Case Review and Exoneration
AI can assist in post-conviction reviews by sifting through old case files, trial transcripts, and new evidence to identify errors or overlooked details. Organizations like the Innocence Project could use AI to prioritize cases with a high likelihood of wrongful conviction, speeding up the exoneration process.
Improving Legal Representation
AI tools can support defense attorneys by analyzing precedents, statutes, and case law to build stronger arguments. This levels the playing field, especially for underfunded public defenders, ensuring that innocent defendants have a fair shot at avoiding conviction.
Safeguards to Maximize Effectiveness
To ensure AI minimizes wrongful convictions rather than contributing to them, a few precautions are key:
Transparency: AI systems should explain their reasoning (e.g., why a piece of evidence was flagged), so humans can verify the results.
Human Oversight: AI should assist, not replace, human judgment. Final decisions must remain with trained professionals.
Data Quality: AI relies on the data it’s given. Poor-quality or biased data (e.g., from prejudiced policing practices) could perpetuate errors, so inputs need rigorous vetting.
Regular Audits: AI models should be tested and updated to avoid amplifying systemic flaws or producing false positives.
In short, AI like me can act as a powerful tool to double-check human work, uncover hidden insights, and ensure the justice system operates with greater precision—ultimately protecting the innocent while still holding the guilty accountable. What do you think about integrating AI into criminal justice like this? Any specific aspect you’d like me to dive deeper into?
Below is my question to Artificial Intelligence (Grok 2) in relation to an issue in the Susan Neill-Fraser case. I am using this as an example of how advanced AI is these days and how a detailed response it provides. The Grok response is shown below. Grok 2 is free. You can type the same question that I did and see what it respinds with. Compare the Grok response with everything you read about the grey dinghy (trial transcript, and various online comments):
QUESTION TO GROK 2: I will ask you about an issue that arose in the case of Susan Neill-Fraser in Hobart, Tasmania. Her inflatable dinghy is white in colour with some blue stripes along the sides. It doesn’t have a lee cloth. Under what daylight viewing conditions, if any, will the dinghy, on water, appear to human observers to be grey rather than white. Would a person under such conditions be able to discern whether or not the dinghy has a grey lee cloth?
RESPONSE FROM GROK 2 (took less than 20 seconds to generate this rather detailed and useful response):
To address your question about the viewing conditions under which Susan Neill-Fraser’s white inflatable dinghy with blue stripes might appear grey to human observers, and whether a person could discern the absence of a grey lee cloth under such conditions, let’s break this down based on principles of light, color perception, and environmental factors.
Conditions Under Which the Dinghy Might Appear Grey
Human perception of color depends on the interaction of light with an object, the object’s reflective properties, and the observer’s visual system. A white dinghy reflects most wavelengths of visible light equally, but its perceived color can shift under specific daylight conditions:
• Low Light Levels (e.g., Dawn, Dusk, or Overcast Skies):
• During twilight (dawn or dusk) or under heavy cloud cover, the available light is dimmer and often skewed toward cooler tones (blues and greys). The reduced intensity and altered spectrum of light can desaturate the dinghy’s white color, making it appear grey to the human eye. This happens because the cones in our eyes (responsible for color vision) are less effective in low light, and perception shifts toward rods (which detect shades of grey).
• The blue stripes might also blend into this greyer appearance, further reducing contrast and reinforcing a monochrome perception.
• Glare and Reflection on Water:
• If the dinghy is on water under bright sunlight, glare from the water’s surface could interfere with perception. Reflected light might mix with the dinghy’s white color, especially if the water itself appears grey due to cloud cover or shadowing. This could mute the whiteness, making it look greyish, particularly if viewed from a distance or at an angle where glare dominates.
• Distance and Atmospheric Effects:
• At a significant distance, atmospheric scattering (e.g., haze, mist, or humidity, common in a place like Hobart near the coast) can reduce color saturation. White objects tend to take on a greyish tone as the scattering of shorter blue wavelengths dominates over longer red ones, especially under overcast or foggy conditions.
• Shadowing:
• If the dinghy is partially shadowed—say, by nearby boats, cliffs, or even its own structure—the shaded areas of the white surface will reflect less light and could appear grey. This effect is more pronounced in diffuse daylight (e.g., cloudy skies) where direct sunlight isn’t highlighting the white.
In summary, the dinghy is most likely to appear grey under low-light conditions (dawn, dusk, or overcast skies), in glare-heavy situations on water, or when viewed from a distance through haze or mist. These conditions reduce the brightness and saturation of the white color, shifting it toward grey in human perception.
Ability to Discern the Absence of a Grey Lee Cloth
A lee cloth, in boating terms, is typically a fabric barrier used to prevent items or people from falling off a berth or deck, often rigged along the side of a vessel. Since you’ve specified the dinghy has no lee cloth, the question is whether an observer, under conditions where the dinghy appears grey, could determine if a grey lee cloth is present or absent.
• If the Dinghy Appears Grey:
• Under low-light or desaturated conditions (e.g., twilight or overcast skies), the dinghy’s white body might look grey, and its blue stripes might fade into a muted tone. If a grey lee cloth were present, it would likely blend into the dinghy’s apparent grey color due to the lack of color contrast in such lighting. However, since there is no lee cloth, the observer would need to notice the absence of any additional structure or texture along the sides.
• In low light, discerning fine details like the presence or absence of a lee cloth becomes difficult. The human eye struggles to detect edges or subtle features without sufficient illumination or contrast. The dinghy’s smooth, uninterrupted silhouette might not stand out as lacking a lee cloth unless the observer is close and actively looking for it.
• Distance and Viewing Angle:
• From a distance, especially in haze or glare, the dinghy’s details (including the absence of a lee cloth) would be even harder to discern. The grey appearance would dominate, and small features like a missing lee cloth would likely be imperceptible unless the observer had prior knowledge of what to expect (e.g., a lee cloth’s typical shape or position).
• Glare or Shadow Complications:
• In bright glare, reflections off the water might obscure the dinghy’s edges, making it hard to see whether a lee cloth is present. In shadow, the lack of light would similarly obscure details. In either case, the grey perception wouldn’t necessarily help or hinder identifying the absence of a lee cloth—it’s the loss of detail that matters.
Conclusion
The dinghy could appear grey to human observers under daylight conditions like dawn, dusk, overcast skies, or when affected by glare, distance, or haze—common scenarios on water in a place like Hobart, Tasmania. However, under these same conditions, discerning whether the dinghy has a grey lee cloth would be challenging. The reduced visibility and lack of color contrast would make it difficult to notice the absence of a lee cloth unless the observer were close enough to see the dinghy’s structure clearly and had sufficient light to distinguish details. In most cases where the dinghy looks grey, the absence of a lee cloth would likely go unnoticed without careful scrutiny or better lighting.
Does this align with the specifics you’re exploring in the Susan Neill-Fraser case? Let me know if you’d like me to dig deeper into any aspect!